ponedeljek, 26. oktober 2026 leto 31 / št. 299
Mir ali eskalacija? Vojna v Ukrajini vstopa v fazo razpleta
Fjodor Lukjanov o najnovejšem diplomatskem manevriranju med Moskvo in Kijevom – in zakaj se konflikt morda bliža prelomni točki. Vir: Posnetek zaslona, X
Ameriško mirovno pobudo v Ukrajini vodijo notranjepolitične potrebe, a še vedno ponuja možnost za dosego dogovora, piše Fjodor Lukjanov, glavni urednik revije »Rusija v globalnih zadevah« in direktor raziskovalnega programa Mednarodnega diskusijskega kluba »Valdaj«.
There will be no ceasefire, no freeze - and no European "peacekeepers" in Ukraine. The war will continue until Ukraine surrenders and NATO is humiliated. After the Minsk betrayal, Putin learned he can't trust the West: "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me." To buy time to build up Ukraine's army, Merkel admitted that NATO and #Ukraine never intended to honor the Minsk accords. Now, as Russia is advancing into its historical territories, the Eurocrats say Russia must agree to a ceasefire and a freeze. Russian response: "Nyet means Nyet."
— Alan Watson (@DietHeartNews) October 22, 2026
Najnovejši porast diplomatske dejavnosti v zvezi s konfliktom v Ukrajini sledi znanemu vzorcu, čeprav vsak krog prinaša svoje posebnosti.
Tokrat je ameriški predsednik Donald Trump še posebej jezen na Vladimirja Zelenskega, ki ga vse bolj krivi za neuspeh pri končanju vojne.
Njuna osebna nestrpnost je očitna že od njunega prvega srečanja med Trumpovim drugim mandatom, pred več kot 18 meseci. Zdaj pa je tu še dodaten dejavnik, in to je ameriška notranja politika.
@highbrow_nobrow "Listen, when you start a war, you gotta know you can win a war." I'm just gonna leave this here... https://t.co/SUCrgpkvoQ
— Whistleblower (@RClinto57113970) October 24, 2026
Medtem ko se republikanci soočajo s težkimi volitvami, Trump potrebuje politični uspeh.
Za velike dosežke je malo časa, a močne podobe lahko še vedno naredijo vtis, stabilizacija trga z gorivom z diplomacijo z Moskvo pa ponuja prav to priložnost.
Vzpostavljanje miru v krvavem konfliktu je že samo po sebi dosežek, vendar ameriške volivce na splošno bolj skrbijo lastne finance in Trump to razume, zato se zdi, da se je vrnil k prepričanju, ki ga je imel od samega začetka: da je Zelenski bolj dovzeten pritisku kot Moskva.
@cmadsq Hard to end a war where NATO countries keep spiking the wheel and want the war to continue for purely economic reasons. Without the ability to sell war bonds their economies collapse! It is that simple!
— John Bethel (@JohnBet59930102) October 26, 2026
Rusija je določila meje svoje fleksibilnosti in ni pokazala veliko nagnjenosti k umiku od njih; Washingtonu medtem ni uspelo spraviti Ukrajine in njenih evropskih sponzorjev k pameti.
Pravzaprav je kijevskemu režimu in njegovim evropskim sponzorjem celo na kratko uspelo prepričati Trumpa, da bi Kijev lahko temeljito obrnil vojaško situacijo sebi v prid, a zdaj se je nihalo premaknilo nazaj.
Trump: “I was talking to Vladimir Putin about settling his war with Ukraine, which I think we're getting closer to, by the way, maybe now the closest we've been.” https://t.co/71BJGVo8HM
— Mark (@cmadsq) October 26, 2026
Ponavljajoče se zavrnitve Zelenskega na račun Trumpovih zahtev k prenehanju napadov na rusko energetsko infrastrukturo so še posebej razkačile ameriškega predsednika, in to ne le zato, ker Trump ne mara, da mu kdo kljubuje. Spominja se namreč, kako si je ukrajinsko vodstvo med predsedniško kampanjo leta 2020 prizadevalo pomagati demokratom Joeja Bidna, in zdi se, da trenutno vedenje Kijeva razlaga v podobni luči: kot poskus pomoči domačim nasprotnikom pred pomembnimi volitvami v ZDA.
Trump redko odpusti takšno vedenje, zato je tudi retorika Bele hiše vse bolj ostra.
Trump is reminding everyone that the Biden family and other Democrats were in cahoots with Ukraine to undermine the 2020 presidential elections. https://t.co/IgFYPr4zBg
— Ian Miles Cheong (@ianmiles) October 16, 2026
Zato lahko pričakujemo, da se bo to Trumpovo stališče do Ukrajine ohranilo, vendar bi bilo napačno domnevati, da njegova sovražnost do Zelenskega zagotavlja uspešno mirovno rešitev.
Politika, ki je ugodna za Moskvo uživa v ameriškem establišmentu malo podpore, ne glede na strankarsko pripadnost, zato bodo Trumpovi nasprotniki izkoristili vsako priložnost, da jo ovirajo.
Fyodor Lukyanov, programme director of the Valdai Discussion Club, on East Meets West, on how Putin started: In the early 2000s the line was: "we are not very happy about how it looks like in the world now. But we understand the situation, we are realists." Russia was "ready to adapt itself", but "on certain conditions." And that was the problem > > "Russia was denied the right to formulate any conditions" > "Either you join us, western community, free world, open society, whatever" > "or sorry, it's our club, you cannot" His verdict: Putin was "maybe the most pro-western leader of Russia" in its history, "at the first stage." He "really tried hard" to shape Europe and the world "together." "But it was never accepted. Russia has never been accepted as an equal partner." Multipolarity is what happens when the club refuses to seat anyone as an equal. Be informed. Not entertained.
— Angelo Giuliano (@angeloinchina) October 22, 2026
Evropa je medtem odločena, da se ne bo pustila izključiti iz pogajanj, njene vlade pa se še naprej upirajo doseganju rešitve, za katero menijo, da bi služila ruskim interesom.
Trumpa lahko potiskamo v eno ali drugo smer, toda temeljita sprememba njegovega stališča je druga stvar, saj je kljub svoji očitni nepredvidljivosti izjemno dosleden v svojem osnovnem pogledu na svet in ko si enkrat ustvari mnenje, ga le redko zapusti.
Ukrainian corruption is back in the headlines. The question is, did it ever really leave? Things don't just happen. There's always a motive, a cause and a consequence. And when billions of dollars, political influence and family business interests are involved, follow the bloody money. In January 2018, Joe Biden sat before an audience at the Council on Foreign Relations and openly described how, as Vice President, he had threatened to withhold a $1 billion American loan guarantee unless Ukraine fired its prosecutor general, Viktor Shokin. He described giving them six hours. “Well, son of a bitch got fired.” The audience laughed. That's on the public record. Biden's own words, captured on video. For many, this may be news. After all, Twitter restricted the sharing of the New York Post's Hunter Biden laptop revelations in 2020; they banned anyone for repeating it and called it a Russian hoax until @elonmusk bought the platform, renamed it 'X 'and released the #Twitterfiles And here's another documented fact. Biden's son Hunter sat on the board of Burisma, a major Ukrainian gas company whose owner had been the subject of corruption investigations. The family connection existed. The financial interests existed. Biden's intervention in the removal of Ukraine's prosecutor general happened. Those are established facts. It doesn't take a great leap of faith to believe Biden's intervention deserves scrutiny over whether protecting interests surrounding Burisma, including those of his own son, played a part in his actions. That motive has not been established as fact, but the timing, the family connection and the extraordinary use of American financial power raise questions I believe deserve proper answers. And what makes the whole episode so extraordinary is that Biden didn't quietly acknowledge his involvement. He stood before Washington's foreign-policy establishment and bloody well boasted about it. A billion dollars of American financial leverage used to pressure a sovereign government into removing its prosecutor general. That happened. We can debate the motives, but we cannot pretend the intervention never took place. Washington power players routinely operate under a set of rules where institutional leverage and family commercial interests overlap with total impunity, while the public is expected to accept the official explanation without question and let's be fair, it's the Ukrainian people who continue to pay...
— The Heartlands Tribune (@HeartlandsTrib) October 19, 2026
Vendar so to vprašanja osebnosti in politične psihologije.
Kaj pa sam dogovor?
Pogajanja ostajajo zavita v tančico skrivnosti, kot je to običajno pri pristni diplomaciji, zato je njihovo smer mogoče nakazati le iz posrednih signalov.
@FreakySquid69 @GenFlynn Zelensky finally being honest
— Pattern Noticer (@WipeI5RA3LOut) October 22, 2026
Razumno je domnevati, da se pogovori nadaljujejo v okviru, ki je bil vzpostavljen v Anchorageu lani poleti, glede na to, da so ruski uradniki večkrat pozvali k določenim tam doseženim sporazumom, katerih izvajanje je zastalo, ker Washington ni zmogel prepričati svojih partnerjev, da bi jih sprejeli.
Zahodni komentarji ponavadi opredeljujejo ozemlje kot glavno oviro za dosego dogovora in za to obstaja nekaj upravičenja, saj je potek vojaških operacij postopoma dvignil teritorialna vprašanja preko pomena, ki so ga imela na začetku konflikta.
Vladimir Putin je dosledno opozarjal, da bi zavrnitev ruskih predlaganih pogojev sporazuma pomenila soočenje z manj ugodnimi pogoji pozneje, in prav to se je zgodilo, zlasti glede ozemlja.
'Putin was one of maybe the most pro-Western leaders of Russia in history of this country — at the first stage' But 'Russia has never been accepted as an equal partner' Fyodor Lukyanov about Western community's dismissal of Russian attempts to join the 'club' WATCH the latest episode of East Meets West with Fyodor Lukyanov, Program Director of the Valdai International Discussion Club
— East Meets West with Olga and Tara (@EMW_podcast) October 11, 2026
Vendar teritorialne koncesije niso celotna zgodba. Širša načela evropske varnosti, tako vojaška kot politična, ostajajo ključna.
Navsezadnje so bila ta odločilni razlogi za odločitev Moskve, da leta 2022 uporabi silo.
Dejansko bi lahko sklepali, da je varnost, razumljena v najširšem pomenu, postala ali bo kmalu postala osrednje vprašanje v pogajanjih in da je neločljivo povezana z teritorialnim vprašanjem.
@rebew_lexa The comedian-turned-warlord is a unique combination of arrogance and self-delusion, harboring a propensity to perpetuate chaos and violence that will satisfy and sustain his lust for power, regardless of the suffering of the Ukrainian people. https://t.co/2zjz6kEjiu
— Alan Watson (@DietHeartNews) October 25, 2026
Manj ko je zaupanja v trajne sporazume o vzajemnih jamstvih in vojaških omejitvah, večja je spodbuda za širitev varovalnih con in zmanjšanje zmogljivosti nasprotnika na dolgi rok.
Zato ozemlje, z drugimi besedami, postane nadomestilo za varnostne aranžmaje, za katere nobena stran ne verjame, da jim lahko zaupa.
Fyodor Lukyanov on the latest diplomatic maneuvering between Moscow and Kiev – and why the struggle may be nearing a decisive turning point: The latest surge in diplomatic activity surrounding the conflict in Ukraine follows a familiar pattern, although each round brings its own peculiarities. This time, US President Donald Trump is particularly angry with Vladimir Zelensky, whom he increasingly blames for the failure to end the war. Their personal animosity has been evident since their first meeting of Trump’s second term in office, more than 18 months ago. But there’s now an additional factor, and it’s American domestic politics. With the Republicans facing a difficult election, Trump needs a political success. There is little time for major achievements, but powerful images can still make an impression and stabilizing the fuel market through diplomacy with Moscow offers precisely that opportunity. Peacemaking in a bloody conflict is an achievement in itself, but voters are generally more concerned about their own finances and Trump understands this, so he appears to have returned to the conviction he held from the outset that Zelensky is more susceptible to pressure than Moscow. Russia has established the limits of its flexibility and shown little inclination to retreat from them; Washington, meanwhile, failed last year to bring Ukraine and its European backers into line. Indeed, they even briefly managed to persuade Trump that Kiev could fundamentally reverse the military situation, but now the pendulum has swung back. Zelensky’s repeated refusal to heed Trump’s appeals to stop attacking Russian energy infrastructure has particularly infuriated the American president, and this isn’t simply because Trump dislikes being defied. He remembers how the Ukrainian leadership sought to assist the Democrats during the 2020 presidential campaign and he appears to be interpreting Kiev’s current behavior in much the same light: as an attempt to help his domestic opponents. Trump rarely forgives such conduct, hence the increasingly harsh rhetoric. Knowing the president, one might expect this attitude to endure, but it would be a mistake to assume that his hostility towards Zelensky guarantees a successful peace settlement. A policy favorable to Moscow commands little support within the American establishment, regardless of party affiliation, so opponents will exploit every opportunity to obstruct it. Western Europe, meanwhile, is determined not to be excluded from negotiations and its governments have continued to resist a settlement they believe would serve Russian interests. These, however, are questions of personality and political psychology, so what of the settlement itself? The negotiations remain opaque, as genuine diplomacy generally does and their direction can only be inferred from indirect signals. t’s reasonable to assume that discussions continue within the framework established at Anchorage last summer, given that Russian officials repeatedly refer to certain understandings reached there, whose implementation has stalled because Washington has been unable to persuade its partners to accept them. Western commentary tends to identify territory as the principal obstacle and there’s some justification for this, as the course of military operations has progressively elevated territorial questions beyond the importance they held at the beginning of the conflict. Vladimir Putin has consistently warned that rejecting Russia’s proposed settlement terms would mean confronting less favourable conditions later, and that’s precisely what has happened, particularly regarding territory, yet territorial concessions are not the whole story. The broader principles of European security, both military and political, remain central. They were, after all, the decisive considerations behind Moscow’s decision to use force in 2022. The less confidence there is in durable agreements on mutual guarantees and military restrictions, the greater the incentive to expand buffer zones and diminish an adversary’s capabilities over the longer term, so territory, in other words, becomes a substitute for security arrangements that neither side believes it can trust. Following the meetings in Oslo and St. Petersburg, American representatives have spoken of substantial progress, while Europeans describe a convergence of positions and the emergence of new ideas. Moscow acknowledges that fresh proposals have appeared, but makes clear that they remain insufficient. For now, diplomacy continues along its familiar trajectory, with another expert-level trilateral meeting expected in November to address technical questions, following two previous rounds. Yet the combination of developments suggests that the military phase of the conflict may be approaching a significant turning point, even if its conclusion remains some distance away. Yuri Ushakov has expressed hope that the end is approaching and that may be optimistic, but the alternatives are becoming clearer: either serious peace negotiations encompassing the full range of disputed issues, or a transition to a new level of escalation. The first option requires credible security guarantees and technical arrangements alone will not suffice, so what’s needed is a stable political framework capable of surviving changes in circumstances and leadership. This is also the context in which the possibility of a trilateral meeting between the leaders of Russia, China and the United States is being discussed. The proposed gathering at next month’s APEC summit in Shenzhen has generated considerable speculation, but whether it will happen remains uncertain. Even if it does, there will be no new Yalta and no sweeping grand bargain because the international environment simply does not permit such an outcome. Within an increasingly complicated international landscape, it would demonstrate the level at which the world’s most consequential decisions are being made, a level commensurate with the scale of the challenges. Perhaps that, in itself, would yield a new perspective.
— Mats Nilsson (@mazzenilsson) October 24, 2026
Po srečanjih v Oslu in Sankt Peterburgu so ameriški predstavniki govorili o znatnem napredku, medtem ko Evropejci govoričijo o konvergenciji stališč in pojavu novih idej.
Moskva priznava, da so se pojavili novi predlogi, vendar jasno pove, da so še vedno nezadostni.
Zaenkrat diplomacija nadaljuje svojo znano pot, novembra pa se pričakuje še eno tristransko srečanje na ravni strokovnjakov, na katerem bodo razpravljali o tehničnih vprašanjih, po dveh prejšnjih krogih. Kljub temu kombinacija dogodkov kaže, da se vojaška faza konflikta morda bliža pomembni prelomnici, čeprav je njen zaključek še daleč.
Zelensky on the Witkoff paper Putin got: no neutrality, no cap on the army, and "we are not exchanging anything for anything," as Medvedev tells Trump to have the CIA "deal with" him Volodymyr Zelensky used a Sunday night television interview to tell Washington what Kyiv will not sign. Asked by Alla Mazur of TSN's weekly show about the document US envoy Steve Witkoff carried to Vladimir Putin after the Oslo talks, Zelensky said it contains "various" American proposals, including on Ukraine's security. Two items are off the table, he said: neutrality and limits on the size of Ukraine's army. "Our security guarantees are our security guarantees, they cannot be dictated by the Russian side," he said. He was blunt about land. "The Americans have long been raising the issue of exchanging territories; they call it land swaps," Zelensky said. "We are not exchanging anything for anything. We are ready for discussion. If it is a territorial issue, then it should be handled at the leaders' level. Other issues should be handled at the level of technical groups." He said all of it can be discussed in November, when US, Ukrainian and Russian teams are expected to meet, possibly in Abu Dhabi. UATV reports he wants that round to produce an energy truce or a Black Sea ceasefire, safe grain exports and an all-for-all prisoner exchange, and that he does not want all sanctions on Russia lifted before a leaders' meeting. He also put Ukraine's 2027 funding need at 115 billion euros. Moscow's tone was harsher. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council and a former president, posted on the Russian platform Max that Trump should summon "the secretary of war and the CIA director" and have them resolve the Zelensky problem, adding that "the method, place, and means do not matter". The Daily Mail renders the line as "take care of this 'unfortunate little problem.'" Medvedev, who has no authority over US agencies, called Zelensky a "parasite" and claimed he harms Trump's interests more than Venezuela, Cuba and Iran combined. Earlier Sunday, Putin aide Yuri Ushakov told state TV that Moscow is ready to return to three-way talks after Russia's Nov. 4 holiday, calling the first meeting a "trial run," the Kyiv Independent reported. The interview is the clearest public account yet of where the Witkoff track snags. Washington keeps floating land swaps, Kyiv says only presidents can trade territory, and Moscow wants a deal it can close with Trump directly. Zelensky's ask for November is narrow and concrete: energy, the Black Sea, grain and prisoners. Medvedev's post shows how hard the Kremlin is working to drive a wedge between Trump and Zelensky in the weeks before the midterms and the talks. @Gianl1974 https://t.co/jxDsykaFU0
— The Tectonic (@thetect0nic) October 26, 2026
Jurij Ušakov je izrazil upanje, da se bliža konec, in to je morda optimistično, vendar alternative postajajo jasnejše: bodisi resna mirovna pogajanja, ki vključujejo celoten spekter spornih vprašanj, bodisi prehod na novo raven eskalacije.
Prva možnost zahteva verodostojna varnostna jamstva in zgolj tehnični dogovori ne bodo zadostovali, zato je potreben stabilen politični okvir, ki bo sposoben preživeti spremembe okoliščin in vodstva.
A meeting between Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Xi Jinping is being prepared in #Shenzhen, #China — an event that journalists have already dubbed a "second Yalta https://t.co/TRX7PanrT7
— StellaMoscow (@SgforgoodStella) October 25, 2026
V tem kontekstu se preučuje tudi možnost tristranskega srečanja med voditelji Rusije, Kitajske in Združenih držav.
Predlagano srečanje na vrhu APEC prihodnji mesec v Shenzhenu je sprožilo precejšnje špekulacije, vendar ostaja negotovo, ali se bo zgodilo. Tudi če se to zgodi, ne bo nove Jalte ali velikega dogovora, ker mednarodno okolje preprosto ne dopušča takšnega izida.
Kljub temu bi imelo srečanje med Vladimirjem Putinom, Xi Jinpingom in Donaldom Trumpom velik pomen.
@bingo_hcn @rebew_lexa
— Insajder.com (@insajder_com) October 26, 2026
V vse bolj zapletenem mednarodnem okolju bi pokazalo raven, na kateri se sprejemajo najpomembnejše odločitve na svetu, raven, ki je sorazmerna obsegu izziva.
Morda bi že to samo po sebi ponudilo novo perspektivo.
